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NOTE

MONTANA V. EGELHOFF: ABANDONING A
DEFENDANT'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
PRESENT A DEFENSE
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution prohibit government actions that deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.' Through these amendments, the Constitution guarantees that fair procedures 2 will control all

1. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Id. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment ensures that the federal government will follow adequate procedures if it seeks to impair an individual's constitutionally
protected interests. See id.
The Fourteenth Amendment similarly restricts actions by the states, stating:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. amend. XIV.
Together, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments restrict any government action aimed
at depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property interests. Id. amend. V; id. amend.
XIV; see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.1, at
510 (5th ed. 1995); RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.1, at 200 (1986); see also Leonard G. Ratner, The
Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1049-50 (1968) (characterizing due process as a restriction on the government's enforcement powers).
2. See 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 1, § 14.6, at 12 (describing procedural due
process as guaranteeing a "fair decision-making process"). Procedural due process, at a
minimum, requires that the government adhere to previously established rules. See id. §
17.1, at 201. Furthermore, the government must provide a neutral decision-maker and an
adjudicatory hearing. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 13.1, at 511; see also
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (concluding that "some kind of hearing
is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests").
The nature of the hearing that is required depends on the circumstances. See 2 ROTUNDA
ET AL., supra note 1, § 17.8, at 250; see also id. § 17.1, at 200 (describing the process due as
that which determines the basis for, and legality of, government deprivations of constitutionally protected individual interests); Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-95 (1975) (discussing the elements of the hearing required to
comply with due process). The essential elements of a fair adjudicatory process may be
broadly categorized as (1) adequate notice, (2) a neutral decision maker,'(3) an opportunity to make an oral presentation, (4) an opportunity to present evidence or witnesses, (5)
an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses or evidence, (6) the right to an attorney, and
(7) a reasoned decision. See 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 1, § 17.8, at 250. In criminal
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government actions3 that impair an individual's life, liberty,' or property
matters, procedural due process may further require (1) compulsory process of witnesses,
(2) pre-trial discovery, (3) a public hearing, (4) a transcript of the hearing, (5) a jury, and
(6) a heightened burden of proof for the prosecution. See id; see also infra notes 8-11 and
accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Amendment's requirements in criminal matters).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV. The type of governmental actions
that implicate due process may be limited to those actions that affirmatively deprive an
individual of constitutionally protected interests. See Friendly, supra note 2, at 1295-1304
(distinguishing between situations in which the government deprives an individual of an
interest and situations in which the government simply refuses to comply with a request).
Due process is required only when an action impairs an individual's life, liberty, or property interests as those categories are defined by the Supreme Court. See 2 ROTUNDA ET
AL., supra note 1, § 17.1, at 200. If a government action does not impair one of the three
categories of individual interests identified in the Constitution, the government is not required to provide any process whatsoever. See id. Thus, the first step of any due process
inquiry is whether the interest affected by a governmental action deserves due process
protection. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972) (concluding that the
range of interests protected by due process is finite); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972) (reasoning that due process protections are not implicated in all instances);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972) (reasoning that the nature of the interest must
be encompassed in the categories of interests specifically recognized by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (noting that
a due process analysis must begin with "a determination of the ... private interest that
has been affected by governmental action").
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has never attempted to
define "life" except, perhaps, in the context of the viability of life. See 2 ROTUNDA ET
AL., supra note 1, § 17.3, at 206. The Supreme Court held that a state may constitutionally deprive a person of life. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976) (rejecting an
argument that the imposition of the death penalty violated the Due Process Clause and
the Eighth Amendment); see also 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 1, § 17.3, at 207 n.8 (discussing additional cases). See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Due Process for Death:
Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1976) (discussing five Supreme Court cases regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty). A state may constitutionally impose the death penalty if it reserves that penalty only for the most serious
of criminal offenses. Cf Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (deeming death too
harsh a penalty for rape).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The concept of liberty is the primary limitation on action by the government with regard to individual rights. See 2 ROTUNDA ET
AL., supra note 1, § 17.4, at 212. At a minimum, due process protection of liberty interests
restricts the government from depriving an individual of physical freedom without following fair procedures. See id. at 213. In addition, liberty has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to protect other fundamental rights under the theory of substantive due
process. See id. at 222-23. Fundamental rights are not expressly protected by the Constitution, but are nonetheless granted constitutional stature by the Court because they are
deemed essential to the concept of liberty or fairness. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 819 n.15 (1975) (discussing fundamental rights); 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 1, §
17.4, at 222-23 (same); Ratner, supra note 1, at 1049-50 (discussing the granting and limiting of rights under due process); see also Faretta,422 U.S. at 821 (protecting a defendant's right to self-representation); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (protecting a defendant's right to testify in his own behalf); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361
(1970) (protecting a defendant's right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt);
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 98-99 (1934) (protecting a defendant's right to be
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interests.' The procedures that are required to ensure fairness depend
present at trial). The Court is reluctant, however, to find new fundamental rights. See
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1990) (refusing to find an infraction of
fundamental fairness where the State introduced evidence relating to a crime for which
the defendant had been acquitted).
The Supreme Court has used the concept of liberty to selectively incorporate the individual rights contained in the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, so as to apply them to the states. See JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED § 2:5, at 2-13 to 2-14 (3d ed. 1996); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 37374 (1979) (ensuring the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in non-felony cases where a
prison term is being imposed); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (extending
the Fifth Amendment bar against double jeopardy to the states); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (extending the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury to the
states); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (extending the Sixth Amendment
right of a defendant to present witnesses to the states); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (extending the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial to the
states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407-08 (1965) (extending the Sixth Amendment
right to be confronted by adverse witnesses to the states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3
(1964) (extending the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the states);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (extending the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
660 (1961) (extending the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948) (extending the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial to
the states).
The Supreme Court has chosen not to extend, however, all of the rights contained in the
Bill of Rights to the states. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (refusing
to extend the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury to the states); see also
COOK, supra, § 2:5, at 2-17 ("The right to an indictment by a grand jury remains one of
the few Bill of Rights protections not held applicable in state prosecutions."); 2
ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 1, § 17.1, at 201 n.4 (confirming that the right to indictment
by grand jury is the only individual interest concerning criminal matters that has not been
incorporated into the concept of liberty).
Despite the Supreme Court's comprehensive incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
concept of liberty, there has been substantial argument concerning the extent to which the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to extend the Bill of Rights to the states. See
COOK, supra, § 2:2, at 2-4; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 2.2., at 35 (1985); RICHARD B. MCNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.01, at 2 (1982). In particular, the due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment has produced several interpretative theories. See COOK, supra, § 2:2, at 2-4 to 2-6. These theories generally focus on whether due
process should be limited to the specifically enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights or
should have an independent meaning of its own. See id. §§ 2:3 to 2:8, at 2-6 to 2-24 (discerning four different theories from the case law); see also Ratner, supra note 1, at 104950 (arguing that these polarized theories are inconsistent with the intent of the Constitution).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Property interests include interests in all of
the traditional forms of real and personal property. See 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 17.5, at 234. The government may not deprive an individual of property without providing a fair adjudicatory process. Cf. id. This right also may apply where the property
interest is less tangible. See id. at 239-41 (discussing government benefits and the requirement that fair procedures be used to deprive an individual of a government established benefit).
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on the circumstances of each case and the weight of the individual and
governmental interests at stake.7 In criminal matters, a defendant's interests are particularly significant,8 and the Sixth Amendment enumer-

ates several additional specific procedural requirements necessary to ensure fairness.9 These guarantees include a defendant's right to confront

7. See McElroy, 367 U.S. at 895. In McElroy, the Court concluded that:
[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set
of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.
Id.; see also 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 1, § 17.8, at 249 (concluding that the required
procedures must be determined by balancing the worth of the procedure to the individual
against its cost to society); infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent conflict between the interests of the state and a defendant with regard to evidence in a
criminal trial). After the Court determines that the right in question deserves due process protection, the Court considers what process is due under the circumstances. See 2
ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 1, § 17.1, at 201. The procedural process the Court requires
differs depending on the individual interests affected by governmental action. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 ("[N]ot all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the
same kind of procedure."). The more important the individual interests at stake, the
greater the procedural safeguards necessary to protect those interests. See Friendly, supra note 2, at 1278.
8. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 362-64. A defendant in a civil matter generally has only
a monetary or property interest at stake, while a defendant in a criminal case may lose
life, liberty, or property. See id. (emphasizing the importance of the defendant's interest
in a criminal trial to support a heightened burden of proof for the prosecution).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights, as well as an independent concept of fundamental fairness imposed by the Due Process Clause, govern the adjudicative process in
criminal trials. See 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 1, § 17.1, at 201; see also supra note 2
(discussing the fairness requirement of due process). The Constitution guarantees fairness through the Due Process Clause, and it defines the elements of a fair trial in criminal
cases largely through the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
684-85 (1984) (addressing the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel).
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1
adverse witnesses" and to compel witnesses to testify.

10. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
applies equally in state and federal criminal proceedings. See Pointer,380 U.S. at 407-08;
see also supra note 5 (discussing, inter alia, the extension of the Sixth Amendment to the

states).
In its most basic form, the Confrontation Clause confers upon a defendant the right to
confront adverse witnesses who testify before the jury at trial. See Snyder, 291 U.S. at
106-07; Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 569-71 (1978) [hereinafter Confrontation] (providing an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the Confrontation and
Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment). The Confrontation Clause also
ensures the defendant a right to be physically present at trial. See Oliver, 333 U.S. at 27273; see also Confrontation,supra, at 572-74 (explaining that the Confrontation Clause protects the defendant from ex parte proceedings). The Sixth Amendment does not provide
an absolute right to be physically present at trial. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 34647 (1970) (upholding a conviction after the defendant was forcibly removed for disrupting
the trial). Perhaps most importantly, the Confrontation Clause ensures that a criminal
defendant has the right to cross-examine the State's witnesses against him. See Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965) (extending the Confrontation Clause to the states);
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (reasoning that the Confrontation
Clause ensures a defendant the right to be present at trial in order to cross-examine adverse witnesses, but does not ensure a defendant the right to be present in an appellate
proceeding where new testimony is not being presented); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S.
458, 474 (1900) (stating that the presentation of witness testimony taken at a previous examining trial is inadmissible for lack of confrontation); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S.
47, 55-56 (1899) (rejecting previous witness testimony taken at another criminal trial for
lack of confrontation); cf. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1895) (holding that
dying declarations and deceased witness' testimony are admissible under some circumstances); see also 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1395, at 150 (Chadbourn rev.
1974) (concluding that the Sixth Amendment "demands confrontation, not for the idle
purpose of gazing upon the witness.., but for the purpose of cross-examination").
The Court emphasized the importance of the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses
in Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). In that case, the defendant sought to introduce the juvenile record of a key prosecution witness to demonstrate bias. See id. at 311.
The trial court refused to allow the evidence pursuant to Alaska law, which restricted the
disclosure of juvenile records. See id. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the
defendant's right to cross-examine was more important than Alaska's law protecting juvenile records. See id. at 320; see also Confrontation, supra, at 580-81 (discussing Davis);
Note, ConstitutionalRestraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant'sFavor: The
Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1465-91 (1975) (analyzing
Davis).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides the criminal defendant the right to compel witnesses to testify on his behalf. See id. This provision, which is
referred to as the Compulsory Process Clause, applies in both federal and state criminal
proceedings. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967); see also supra note 5
(discussing the extension of the Sixth Amendment to the states); infra note 16 (discussing
Washington).
The Compulsory Process Clause can be viewed as a mirror image of the Confrontation
Clause. See Confrontation,supra note 10, at 569. Whereas the Confrontation Clause ensures that the defendant in a criminal trial is permitted to cross-examine adverse witnesses, the Compulsory Process Clause allows him to produce witnesses in his favor. See
id. at 593. Most notably, compulsory process provides a defendant the right to subpoena
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The United States Constitution does not expressly guarantee a defendant the right to present a defense. 2 Implicit in the concept of fairness
provided in the Fourteenth Amendment and the enumerated rights provided in the Sixth Amendment, however, is a criminal defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. 3 Although the right to present a
witnesses. See id. at 587. The right is not limited to the power to subpoena favorable witnesses; rather, it encompasses the ability to elicit testimony from those witnesses at trial.
See Washington, 388 U.S. at 19; Confrontation, supra note 10, at 593; see also Alexander
Schure, Note, Taylor v. Illinois: Compulsory Process vs. The Preclusion Sanction, 10
WHirrIER L. REV. 741, 756-57 (1989) (analyzing the constitutional wording of the Compulsory Process Clause and concluding that it is not limited to the subpoena power).
The right to present witness testimony is not absolute. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S.
400, 401-02 (1988) (upholding the preclusion of witness testimony as a discovery sanction). A defendant does not have a constitutional right to present testimony "that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence." Id. at
410. In addition, witness testimony must be material and favorable to the defense in order to be constitutionally protected. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858, 872-74 (1982) (holding that the deportation of defense witnesses did not deprive the
defendant of compulsory process because he did not show that the lost testimony "would
be both material and favorable to the defense").
12. See Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713, 794-801 (1976) (arguing that the
right to present a defense arises from the Due Process Clause); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 95-101 (1974) [hereinafter Compulsory
Process] (arguing that the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause was intended
by the Framers of the Constitution to provide a defendant the right to present a defense);
see also infra note 45 (discussing the divergent views regarding the origin of a defendant's
right to present a defense).
13. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986); see also Clinton, supra note 12,
at 713 (reasoning that the Constitution does not expressly grant a defendant the right to
present a defense, but the Sixth Amendment assumes such a right). In Crane, the Court
reasoned, "[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense."' 476 U.S. at 690 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479,485 (1984)).
English common law provided a defendant only a minimal opportunity to present a defense, possibly because the defendant was not permitted to bear witness against the
Crown. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 716-17; Compulsory Process, supra note 12, at 82
(explaining that the accused "had no right to confront the witnesses against him in person;
he had no right to summon witnesses in his favor, or, indeed, to present witnesses who
were willing to testify voluntarily"). Although English criminal procedure in the seventeenth century took gradual steps toward ensuring a defendant the right to present a defense, Parliament did not address this right until early in the eighteenth century, when it
granted criminal defendants accused of treason and related crimes the right to present
witness testimony. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 718-20; Compulsory Process,supra note
12, at 87-90. Nonetheless, criminal defendants lacked the right to counsel and the right to
compel witness testimony in their favor well into the eighteenth century. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 720.
Early colonial practice similarly paid little attention to an accused's right to present a
defense. See id. at 724. As a result, summary convictions were widespread. See id. at
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defense is a well accepted principle in modern criminal jurisprudence,
4
the United States Supreme Court was slow to recognize this right. Not
until 1967 did the Supreme Court clearly recognize a right to present a
defense in a criminal trial. 5 Once the Supreme Court recognized a right
725-26. By the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, an accused had the right to address
the jury in his defense. See id. at 727; Compulsory Process,supra note 12, at 93 (pointing
out that by 1750, an accused had the right to subpoena witnesses and place them under
oath in Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia). The Constitution addressed the procedural deficiencies of the time in order to ensure a fairer trial. See
Clinton, supra note 12, at 738-39. In so doing, the Constitution did not expressly address
a defendant's right to present a defense, because that right already existed. See id.; Compulsory Process, supra note 12, at 95-101 (reasoning that the wording of the Compulsory
Process Clause, although not expressly preserving the right to present a defense, was
clearly intended to ensure that right).
14. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 742. A "right to be heard" developed in the nineteenth century. Id. at 748. The first cases to recognize the right arose during the Civil
War when the United States sought to confiscate property from confederate sympathizers. See id. In Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876) and McVeigh v. United States,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 267 (1870), the Supreme Court reversed lower court orders of forfeiture that were made because the defendant, fearing arrest, appeared before the court
by counsel rather than in person. In both cases, the Supreme Court rejected summary
orders by relying on the right to be heard, which it referred to as a principle of natural
justice. See McVeigh, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 267; Windsor, 93 U.S. at 277; see also Clinton,
supra note 12, at 748. Following the McVeigh and Windsor cases, the Court in Hovey v.
Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), clearly held that the Due Process Clause confers a right to be
heard in one's defense. Id. at 417-18; see also Clinton, supra note 12, at 749. In Hovey,
the trial court struck a party's answer and ordered judgment against him because he failed
to turn over money to the court and refused to appear before the court. 167 U.S. at 41012. Thereafter, the right to be heard was firmly established in civil cases. See Clinton,
supra note 12, at 749.
In Cooke v. United States, the Court extended the right to be heard to a federal court
contempt proceeding. 267 U.S. 517, 537-38 (1925); see also Clinton, supra note 12, at 750.
In Cooke, the Supreme Court reversed a contempt of court order because the lower court
did not provide an opportunity to respond to the contempt charge. 267 U.S. at 537-38. In
In re Oliver, the Court extended Cooke to a state court contempt proceeding using the
Due Process Clause. 333 U.S. 257, 274 (1948); see also Clinton, supra note 12, at 751. In
Oliver, the trial court charged a witness with contempt because the witness' testimony
contradicted the testimony of a previous witness. 333 U.S. at 259. The lower court failed
to provide the witness an opportunity to refute the contempt charge. See id. at 272-73.
The Supreme Court determined that the summary sentencing of a witness for contempt
constituted a violation of the right to be heard in one's defense. See id. at 273. Thus,
Cooke and Oliver established the principle that a person has a fundamental constitutional
right to present a defense arising from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Clinton, supra note 12, at 751. In fact, in Oliver the Court clearly stated that "[a] person's
right to... be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our system of
jurisprudence." 333 U.S. at 273.
15. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967); see also Clinton, supra note 12,
at 763-64; cf Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962) (upholding a state recidivist sentencing procedure where the Court found sufficient constitutional protection of the right
to be heard). In Specht, the Supreme Court extended the right to be heard, developed in
civil cases and criminal contempt proceedings, directly to the criminal trial process. 386
U.S. at 609-10. The Court overturned a Colorado sex offender statute that enabled sum-
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to present a defense, it began to define the extent to which states could
impair that right with procedures and evidentiary rules.16
In the landmark decision Chambers v. Mississippi,17the United States

Supreme Court considered whether the exclusion of critical defense evidence denied a defendant due process of law.'" Using two state evidentiary rules, the trial court in Chambers suppressed testimony by several
defense witnesses." The evidence tended to demonstrate that a person
other than the defendant had committed the crime for which he was

charged. 0 The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had been
denied a fundamental constitutional right to present a defense that in-

mary sentencing of sex offenders if the trial court determined that the accused posed a
threat of bodily harm to members of the public. See id at 607, 610-11. The Court reasoned that the statute denied the accused of a fundamental right to defend, that was protected by the Due Process Clause. See id.
The late recognition of a substantive right to defend oneself may be due to the rarity of
summary convictions in American jurisprudence. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 751. Historically, at least some kind of defense was permitted prior to convicting an accused
criminal. See id. at 750-51. Thus, very few cases have squarely raised the issue of a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. See id. at 751; see also Confrontation,
supra note 10, at 586 (noting how few Supreme Court cases have actually interpreted a
defendant's right to compulsory process).
16. See Clinton; supra note 12, at 778. Traditionally, the Court disposed of cases
dealing with a state's impairment of a defendant's ability to present a defense by applying
one of the specifically enumerated rights of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. See id. at
756. The Court largely ignored the Due Process Clause as a basis for a defendant's right
to present a defense in a criminal trial. See id. at 756; see also supra notes 14-15 (discussing the development of the right to be heard in contempt proceedings).
Once the Court found a substantive right to defend, it began to use that right to dispose
of cases where the state impaired the right by excluding evidence. See Clinton, supra note
12, at 764. In the landmark case, Washington v. Texas, the defendant sought to call a witness who had already been convicted of murder in the same shooting incident to testify
that the defendant did not pull the trigger and had tried to stop the murder. 388 U.S. 14,
16 (1967). Relying on a state statute that prohibited the submission of accomplice testimony, the trial court prohibited the defendant from presenting the testimony. See id. at
16-17. The defendant was convicted of murder. See id. at 17. On appeal, the Supreme
Court concluded that the defendant had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, which the Court simultaneously concluded was incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 17-19; see also Clinton, supra
note 12, at 765-66. Even after Washington, the Court continued to couch a defendant's
procedural rights in the specific guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-13 (1972) (utilizing the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel to find unconstitutional a state statute that required the defendant to testify first, if at all); see also
Clinton, supra note 12, at 771-72.
17. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
18. Id. at 289-90.
19. Id. at 294; see also infra note 45 (explaining the facts of Chambers in detail).
20. See Chambers,410 U.S. at 294.
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cluded a right to present exculpatory evidence."
In Montana v. Egelhoff,2 the United States Supreme Court addressed

a defendant's right to present a defense in the context of a state statute
that precluded jury consideration of intoxication evidence that negated

an essential element of the crime.2'

James Egelhoff was accused of

committing two murders after police found him highly intoxicated with
21. See id. at 302. Chambers followed Washington v. Texas and another important
case, Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972). Webb was the first case to rest a defendant's
right to present evidence solely on the Due Process Clause, rather than referring to the
specifically enumerated rights of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. See Clinton, supra note
12, at 778. In Webb, the defendant's only witness was a prisoner with an extensive criminal record. 409 U.S. at 95. After the trial judge emphatically warned the witness not to
perjure himself, the witness refused to testify altogether. See id. at 95-96. The Supreme
Court concluded that the judge's admonishments coerced the witness into refusing to testify and thereby denied the defendant the right to present evidence in his defense. See id.
at 98. Like the exclusion of accomplice testimony in Washington, Webb involved the
complete exclusion of a defense witness' testimony, and therefore could have been decided on Sixth Amendment grounds. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 781. Chambers is significant because it dealt with only a partial exclusion of witness testimony, and because
the Court disposed of the case by referring only to the Due Process Clause. See id. at 791.
Chambers, therefore, clearly stands for a defendant's fundamental right to present defense evidence. See id. at 791-92. But see Peter Westen, Compulsory Process11, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 191, 207 (1975) [hereinafter Compulsory ProcessII] (concluding that Washington
v. Texas stands for a defendant's "constitutional right to present any evidence that may be
deemed to establish the existence of facts in his favor").
Since Chambers, the Court consistently has found a fundamental right to present a defense that includes a right to present defense evidence. In Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979), the Court considered a case where the trial court excluded critical defense evidence on hearsay grounds. Id. at 96. Once again, the Court reasoned that the exclusion
violated the Due Process Clause because the evidence was highly relevant to a critical
issue in the case. See id. at 97. In Crane v. Kentucky, the Court held that the exclusion of
evidence, pertaining to whether a defendant's confession was voluntary, deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to present a defense. 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). In Rock v.
Arkansas, the Court determined that the automatic exclusion of post-hypnotically refreshed testimony violated the defendant's right to present a defense. 483 U.S. 44, 52
(1987). In Taylor v. Illinois, the Supreme Court determined that the preclusion of defense witness testimony as a discovery sanction was a justifiable restriction on the defendant's right to present evidence. 484 U.S. 400, 416 (1988). The Court conducted a
searching inquiry, however, in making that determination, and noted that "[t]he right of
the defendant to present evidence 'stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth
Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the States."' Id. at 409
(quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967)). Finally, in the landmark case
United States v. Nixon, the Court emphasized the importance of a defendant's right to
present defense evidence when the Court determined that privileged communications by
the President did not outweigh the "fundamental demands of due process of law in the
fair administration of criminal justice." 418 U.S. 683, 716 (1974). Thus, Chambers and
the cases that have followed it establish that a defendant has a fundamental right to present a defense that includes the right to present evidence.
22. 116 S.Ct. 2013 (1996) (plurality opinion).
at 2016; see also infra Part II (discussing the case in detail).
23. See id.
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two dead victims.24 At trial, Egelhoff presented evidence of his intoxication to challenge the State's assertion that he was capable of having

committed the killings." The trial court relied on a Montana statute
prohibiting the consideration of evidence of intoxication as it relates to a

defendant's mental state,26 and issued an instruction that expressly forbade the jury from considering the defendant's intoxication in determining whether he acted knowingly or purposely.27 The jury convicted
Egelhoff, and he appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, arguing that
the statute and concomitant instruction denied him due process of law.0
. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with Egelhoff. 2 Relying on
Chambers, the court concluded in a unanimous opinion that Egelhoff

had been denied a fair opportunity to defend himself against the State's
accusations 0 The court further reasoned that the instruction had, in effect, lowered the State's burden of proof because it denied Egelhoff an

opportunity to raise doubt as to the requisite mental state necessary to
commit deliberate homicide.31 The State of Montana appealed, and the

United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.32
The United States Supreme Court reversed.33 In a plurality opinion,

Justice Scalia restricted Chambers to its facts and refused to apply its
24. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016 (plurality opinion).
25. See id. Egelhoff submitted evidence of intoxication arguing that he was physically incapable of shooting the victims. See id.
26. See id. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995) states that:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be
taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is
an element of the offense unless the defendant proves that he did not know that
it was an intoxicating substance when he consumed... the substance causing the
condition.
Id.
27. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016 (plurality opinion). The jury instruction read:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be
taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is
an element of the offense unless the Defendant proves that he did not know that
it was an intoxicating substance when he consumed the substance causing the
condition.
Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 263 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (plurality opinion).
28. See Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 263-64.
29. See id at 265-66.
30. See idt at 265.
31. See id at 266.
32. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995).
33. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (plurality opinion).
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reasoning to Egelhoff. 4 Justice Scalia relied on the common law princi-35
ple that intoxication should not provide an excuse for criminal conduct
and found that the presentation of exculpatory evidence of intoxication
is not "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
'
ranked as fundamental. 36
Thus, Justice Scalia found no right that deserved constitutional protection.37
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment.38 She reasoned that Montana was free to define the elements of its crimes.39 Since the statute's
exclusion of intoxication evidence could be construed as merely redefining the mental elements of deliberate homicide, Justice Ginsburg

found that the statute constituted a permissible exercise of state authority.40 A majority of the Court, therefore, concluded that Montana's exclusion of evidence of intoxication as it relates to a defendant's mental

state did not violate Egelhoff s right to present a defense. 4'
This Note considers the constitutional validity of a state statute that

excludes exculpatory evidence that is relevant to an essential element of
a crime. First, this Note discusses the state of the law in this area before
Montana v. Egelhoff, and analyzes the impact Egelhoff has on a defendant's ability to present exculpatory evidence at trial. Next, this Note
questions the Supreme Court's reliance on eighteenth century common

34. See id. at 2021-23. Justice Scalia reasoned that the holding in Chambers was not
that a defendant had a right to defend against the State's accusations whenever critical
evidence is excluded, but that erroneous evidentiary rulings can, when taken together,
rise to the level of a due process violation. See id. at 2022; see also EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE § 2-2, at 20 n.51 (1990) (criticizing such a
narrow reading of Chambers).
35. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2018 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia looked to early
English common law and determined that intoxication had been unavailable as an excuse.
See id. He concluded that the unavailability of intoxication evidence to excuse wrongdoing demonstrated that there was no fundamental right to present exculpatory evidence of
intoxication. See id. at 2018-19. He reasoned that the defendant in this case had failed to
prove that the presentation of intoxication evidence is a principle of fundamental justice.
See id. at 2019.
36. Id. at 2017 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)). In
Patterson, the Court upheld a state statute that placed on the defendant the burden of
proving an affirmative defense, concluding that state powers concerning criminal matters
should not be abridged unless a state violates a fundamental principle of justice. 432 U.S.
197, 201-02 (1977) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)).
37. See Egelhoff, 116 S.Ct. at 2023 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia found no prior
cases directly holding that the right to present all evidence bearing on the elements of a
crime is fundamental. See id
38. See id. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
39. See id
40. See id.
41. See id. at 2023-24 (plurality opinion); id. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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law to determine what constitutes a "fundamental principle of justice" in
evidentiary matters, as well as its disregard for Chambers, its progeny,
and the law of a majority of the states. This Note agrees with the Montana Supreme Court, which provided a better reasoned application of

case law and a more sound disposition of the case. Finally, this Note
concludes that Montana v. Egelhoff creates considerable problems for
future courts deciding questions concerning a state's ability to impair a
defendant's right to present a defense and to be proven guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.
I.

THE RIGHT TO PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE PRIOR TO
MONTANA V. EGELHOFF

An inherent conflict exists between a defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence and a state's interest in administering its criminal justice system.42 A defendant must be able to present evidence in order to
provide an adequate defense.43 A state must be allowed to create procedures and evidentiary rules that may burden a defendant's ability to present a defense, however, in order to maintain the integrity of the trial
process.44 In Chambers, the Supreme Court established that the right to
42. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1988) (explaining that the principle
that supports the defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence also supports the rules
of procedure that limit the presentation of evidence); Compulsory Process H, supra note
21, at 305-06 (describing the conflict as a multi-faceted one). Professor Westen has identified six conflicting interests regarding the exclusion of evidence. See id. These include:
(1) the defendant's interest in presenting evidence, (2) a witness' interest in avoiding the
burden of testifying, (3) the public's interest in obtaining justice, (4) the trial court's interest in resolving evidentiary matters, (5) the appellate court's interest in uniform application of the law, and (6) the judiciary's interest in efficiency. See id. Professor Westen
suggests that Supreme Court precedent has shown that the defendant's interest should be
paramount in balancing these competing interests. See id. at 306.
43. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 409. In Taylor, the Court stated that "[t]he right of the
defendant to present evidence 'stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the States."' Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967)). Precluding evidence may in some cases prevent an
accused from presenting a defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)
(concluding the exclusion of "critical evidence" denied the defendant a fair trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (explaining that the right to compel the testimony
of witnesses "is in plain terms the right to a defense").
44. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410-11. For example, a defendant does not have an absolute right to offer testimony that is otherwise inadmissible under a state's rules of evidence. See id. at 410. A state's interest in administering criminal justice through an orderly trial is sufficient "to justify the imposition and enforcement of firm, though not
always inflexible, rules relating to the identification and presentation of evidence." See
id. at 411. Furthermore, the states are primarily responsible for criminal justice. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977). This responsibility includes defining the
elements of criminal offenses as well as any allowable defenses. See id. In the administra-
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present a defense includes a right to present exculpatory evidence.45
Chambers failed, however, to establish an analytical framework to address the conflict between the right to present a defense and a state's

tion of criminal justice through the trial process, a state may exclude evidence through
evidentiary rules that serve the interests of fairness and reliability. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986); see also Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. The' state may also
exclude evidence to ensure efficiency. See Susan F. Mandiberg, Protecting Society and
Defendants Too: The ConstitutionalDilemma of Mental Abnormality and Intoxication Defenses, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 221, 245 (1984) (reasoning that "states have an interest in
avoiding the inefficient use of judicial and community resources").
45. 410 U.S. at 285. The Supreme Court in Chambers considered a defendant's right
to present a defense in the context of two evidentiary rulings by the trial court that excluded evidence tending to exonerate the defendant. See id. at 291-93. The first evidentiary exclusion involved Mississippi's voucher rule, which precluded the crossexamination of one's own witnesses. See id. at 296-97. Chambers called McDonald as a
witness because McDonald had confessed to police that he committed the crime. See id.
at 291. On cross-examination, however, McDonald testified that he had subsequently repudiated the confession. See id. Chambers sought to redirect, treating McDonald as a
hostile witness, but the court ruled that the voucher rule precluded him from treating his
own witness as hostile. See id. at 296-97. The second evidentiary exclusion involved hearsay testimony. See id. at 292. Chambers sought to present testimony by three additional
witnesses to whom McDonald had made similar confessions on different occasions. See
id. at 292-93. The trial court in Chambers prevented Chambers from presenting this testimony because it constituted hearsay. See id. at 292. Upon review, the Supreme Court
concluded that the trial court had applied the voucher and hearsay rules mechanically, so
as to exclude otherwise relevant, trustworthy, and probative evidence and thereby denied
Chambers a fair opportunity to defend against the state's accusations. See id. at 302.
The Court in Chambers held that a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense that includes a right to present exculpatory evidence. See id. The constitutional
origin of the right has raised significant debate among commentators. See Clinton, supra
note 12, at 794 (reasoning that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
an acceptable source of a defendant's right to present defense evidence and also concluding that the "penumbras" of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments might be the source of
the right); Compulsory Process, supra note 12, at 98-101 (arguing that the Compulsory
Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment is the source of a defendant's right to present
evidence and was not intended to be limited to witness testimony); Compulsory Process
II, supra note 21, at 207 (arguing that the Supreme Court recognized the Compulsory
Process Clause as guaranteeing a defendant's right to present relevant evidence in Washington v. Texas); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-2, at 13-29 (explaining that
courts have invoked several different constitutional sources for the right to present evidence: the Due Process Clauses, the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause, the
Confrontation Clause, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment). The Supreme Court
acknowledged the debate in Crane v. Kentucky, but concluded that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,"
whether rooted in the Fourteenth or the Sixth Amendment. 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)
(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); cf. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (concluding that the Constitution ensures a fair trial through the Due
Process Clause, but defines the elements of a fair trial through the Sixth Amendment);
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1975) (recognizing the Compulsory Process
Clause guarantees an accused the right to present a defense).
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ability to impair that right."6 Nonetheless, an analytical framework has
developed since Chambers.47
When considering a constitutional challenge to a state statute, the Supreme Court first considers whether the particular statute, on its face,
explicitly violates an individual's constitutionally protected rights. 48 If
the Court finds that a statute facially violates a constitutionally protected
right, the Court will strike down the statute." Otherwise, the Court considers whether the statute operates so as to impair any constitutionally

protected right.5" If the Court determines that a statute impairs a constitutionally protected right by operation, the Court balances the defendant's and the state's interests to determine which is more important under the particular circumstances presented by the case."
46. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 792-93. The Court in Chambers noted that it was
not establishing a new principle of constitutional law. 410 U.S. at 302; see also Clinton,
supra note 12, at 796 (arguing that Chambers represents a significant development in the
right to present a defense despite the Court's qualification). Irrespective of the Court's
apparent self-limitation, the case made clear that a defendant has a right to defend that
includes a right to present evidence, and the Court has continued to reiterate that view.
See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 1-2, at 8; see also supra note 21 (discussing cases
following Chambers).
47. See infra Parts I.A, I.B (discussing the framework that has developed).
48. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446-48 (1992) (conducting a historical
analysis of a state statute that allocated the burden of proof on the defendant to prove
incompetence); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 200-01 (conducting an historical analysis of a New
York statute that placed the burden of proof on the defendant to show severe emotional
disturbance); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-3, at 32 (reasoning that a facial
analysis entails an objective determination by the Court as to whether a statute is unconstitutional).
49. See infra Part II.A.
50. See infra Part II.B. It is this second inquiry, concerning the operation of state
procedures or rules under the specific circumstances of a given case, that is most appropriate in evidentiary exclusion cases. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-3, at 33;
Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 879-80 (1991) (reasoning
that evidentiary exclusions in a criminal trial should be determined on a case-by-case basis); cf Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2032 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (pointing
out that the plurality ignored the important second step of the due process inquiry).
51. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1382 (1996) (providing a careful balancing of the defendant's and the State's interests in considering an infringement upon a
defendant's fundamental right to be tried only if competent); see also IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 34, § 2-3, at 31-32 (reasoning that an as-applied balancing test is applicable to
evidentiary exclusion cases); Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 236 (reasoning that both a
state's interest and a defendant's interest may be compelling depending on the circumstances and suggesting such interests should be balanced in determining whether evidence
of mental abnormality or intoxication should be admitted); infra Part II.C (discussing the
dissenting opinions in Egelhoff, which asserted that a balancing test should have been
used by the Court).
In Medina v. California, the Supreme Court rejected the balancing test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 442 (1976), to determine the constitutional validity of
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A. The FirstInquiry: DeterminingWhether a Statute Explicitly Violates a
ConstitutionallyProtectedInterest on Its Face
A court first considers whether a challenged statute explicitly violates
a constitutionally protected interest on its face." In Patterson v. New
York, 3 the Supreme Court stated that it will uphold a statute unless it
violates "some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."-" Historical practice and traditional notions of fairness are probative as to whether an
a statute. 505 U.S. at 443. Instead, the Court conducted a facial analysis to determine
that the statute in question did not violate a historically protected constitutional interest.
See id. at 448-53. It is unclear whether the Court was rejecting balancing altogether, or
just the formula provided in Mathews, because the Court did not find any interest impaired by the statute that would have required balancing. See id. at 453-54 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring). Since the Court has continued to utilize a balancing approach in cases decided after Medina, the Court must have intended only to reject the Mathews approach
when determining whether a state's procedures comport with due process. See Cooper,
116 S. Ct. at 1382.
Commentators widely agree that a balancing test is applicable to evidentiary exclusion
cases. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 798 (concluding that balancing state interests with a
defendant's right to defend is appropriate); IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-3, at 31
(noting that the Supreme Court has indicated that it is proper to balance a state's interest
in an evidentiary exclusion with an accused's right to present a defense); cf. Mandiberg,
supra note 44, at 228-31 (advocating a balancing test in evidentiary exclusion cases).
52. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,201-02 (1977). A plurality of the Court
in Montana v. Egelhoff relied on Patterson to conduct a facial analysis of Montana's exclusionary statute. 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017 (1996) (plurality opinion). Essentially, a facial
analysis entails a determination as to whether a statute explicitly violates the constitutional rights of the public in general. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-3(a), at 32.
If the Court has not previously identified the interest violated by the statute as one deserving constitutional protection, the Court nonetheless may find that the interest is a
fundamental interest, arising from the concepts of liberty or fairness that are protected by
due process. See supra note 5 (discussing fundamental rights).
According to some commentators, evidentiary exclusions rarely should be found facially unconstitutional, because each case should be considered under the particular circumstances presented by the facts in the case. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 807 & n.451;
see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-3, at 32-33. According to Professor Imwinkelried, facial analysis has been limited largely to statutes analyzed under the First Amendment, and is probably less appropriate in cases where a defendant is challenging a state's
ability to impair a defendant's rights. See id.; cf Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)
(reasoning that a state's legitimate interest in barring evidence for reliability purposes
does not extend to wholesale exclusions of evidence that may be reliable in a particular

case).
53. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
54. Id. at 202 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)); see also Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952) (quoting the same passage from Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). In Patterson,the Court determined that a New York statute that placed on the defendant the burden of proving a defense of severe emotional disturbance did not implicate a fundamental interest. 432 U.S at 205. The Court reasoned
that the defendant bore the burden for similar defenses at common law; therefore, the
burden did not violate a fundamental right. See id. at 202.
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individual interest is fundamental.5 The Court considers the individual
interest in light of the historical treatment of that interest under English
and early American common law. 6 The Court also may give weight to

contemporary practices, such as the law of a majority of the states, in assessing whether a state's treatment of a particular individual interest is
supported by historical precedent." If the Court finds that a statute has a
significant historical basis, it will be less likely to hold as fundamental the
individual interest the statute has violated. 8 If the Court determines that
an individual interest historically has been protected, or arises from traditional notions of fairness, it will label the interest fundamental and
strike down the statute. 9
B. The Second Inquiry: Determining Whether a Statute Adversely
Impairs Any ConstitutionallyProtected Interest by Operation

If the Court determines that a statute does not violate a constitutionally protected right on its face, the Court then considers whether the
statute "transgresses any recognized principle of 'fundamental fairness'
in operation. ' 6 This inquiry requires the Court to identify the effects of
55. See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377. The Court has suggested that consideration
should be given to the law at the time when the Fifth Amendment was adopted and the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified when conducting an historical analysis of an individual's rights. See Patterson,432 U.S. at 202.
56. See Cooper, 116 S.Ct. at 1377.
57. See id. In Cooper, the Court considered the constitutional validity of an Oklahoma statute, which required the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he was incompetent to stand trial. Id. The Court considered the near uniform use of
a lesser burden of proof by a majority of the states to conclude that the heightened burden required by Oklahoma was excessive and offensive to traditional principles of justice.
See id. at 1380 (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992)). Contemporary
practice is not considered dispositive as to whether a defendant's interest is fundamental.
See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 447 (1992); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,
236 (1987) (asserting that the constitutional validity of a statute is not determined by
cataloging the practices of the states). The Court, in fact, has expressed a reluctance to
find new fundamental rights. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1990)
(explaining that the category of rights deemed fundamental is very narrow); see also supra
note 5 (discussing fundamental rights).
58. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202 (upholding a statute with a long common law history).
59. See Cooper, 116 S.Ct. at 1377. In In re Winship, the Court struck down a state
statute that lowered the prosecution's burden of proof in juvenile proceedings. 397 U.S.
358, 363-64 (1970). The Court reasoned that a heightened standard of proof is essential
to traditional notions of fairness inherent in American criminal justice. See id. at 363; see
also supra note 5 (discussing fundamental rights).
60. Medina, 505 U.S. at 448 (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352
(1990)); see also Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1380 (relying on Medina and Dowling); Montana v.
Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2031 (1996) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the statute upon any constitutionally protected interest previously identified by the Court.6' Two interrelated fundamental rights may be impaired by the operation of a statute that excludes evidence.62 These
rights are a defendant's right to present a defense6 3 and a defendant's
right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."O A state statute
that excludes evidence from jury consideration may impair a defendant's
ability to present a defense. 65 Thus, the Court in Chambers determined

that an otherwise permissible exclusion of hearsay evidence was unconstitutional because it significantly impaired the defendant's ability to present a defense.

66

A statute also may lessen the state's constitutionally

61. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 448 (finding no facial violation, the Court turned to consider whether a statute operated so as to impair "any recognized principle of 'fundamental fairness"' (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990))); Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1979) (considering the effects of a jury instruction on the
prosecution's constitutionally prescribed burden of proof).
62. See Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1255-57 & n.ll (1978) (discussing the
connection between the right to present defense evidence and the right to be proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).
63. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (discussing the right to defend).
64. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521 (holding that a jury instruction relieved the State
of its constitutionally prescribed burden of proof); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100,
104 (1972) (holding that a jury instruction, which placed the burden of proof on the defendant, violated the right to present a defense by lessening the prosecution's constitutionally prescribed burden of proof); Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (holding that the Due Process Clause requires that a defendant be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to
every fact necessary to constitute the crime); cf. Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 231-32 (explaining the effect evidentiary exclusions have on the burden of proof in criminal cases in
which a defendant's mental state is at issue).
65. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that an exclusion
of critical hearsay evidence violated a defendant's right to present a defense); Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (holding that a state statute precluding accomplice testimony violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process); cf. Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal means by which
the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested."); supra notes 10
and 11 and accompanying text (discussing the defendant's rights to confront adverse witnesses and to compel witnesses to testify).
66. 410 U.S. at 302-03 (reasoning that the trial court's exclusion of critical evidence,
coupled with its refusal to permit the defendant to cross-examine an adverse witness, denied the defendant a fair trial); see also supra note 45 (discussing Chambers).
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prescribed burden of proof. 67 Thus, in Sandstrom v. Montana," the Su-

preme Court reasoned that a jury instruction did not explicitly violate a
fundamental right, but created a presumption that unfairly lowered the
state's burden of proof.69 Therefore, even when no constitutionally protected right is found to be violated on the face of a statute, a statute
nonetheless may operate so as to impermissibly impair a defendant's
constitutional rights.70
C. Balancing a State's Interest in Administering Criminal Law with a
Defendant's ConstitutionallyProtectedInterest

If a state statute is found to impair a constitutionally protected interest, the Supreme Court will balance the competing state and individual

interests.7 The Court conducts this balancing by assessing the importance of the individual and state interests, and comparing the interests to
determine which is more important under the specific facts presented by
the case.72 A state statute that is found to impair a defendant's constitu-

67. See supra note 64 (discussing state actions the Court found violative of the prosecution's constitutionally prescribed burden of proof). The Supreme Court has long found
that a defendant has a fundamental right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64 (discussing the role of the reasonable doubt standard in
the American criminal justice system). The standard provides the foundation of the presumption of innocence. See id.; see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452-61
(1895) (discussing the history of the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt
standard). In Sandstrom, the Court considered the effect of a jury instruction that created
a presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his acts. 442 U.S. at
513. The Supreme Court concluded that the instruction operated so as to relieve the
State of its constitutionally prescribed burden of proof on the issue of defendant's mental
state. See id. at 521. At least one commentator has suggested that the exclusion of relevant exculpatory evidence at trial lessens the state's burden of proof, thereby rendering
the presumption of innocence illusory. See Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 233-34.
68. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
69. Id. at 521.
70. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (finding no facial violation, the
Court turned to consider a statute's operative effect on the defendant's right to a fair
trial).
71. See Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 229; see also supra note 51-52 (discussing the
application of a balancing test).
72. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 799; Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 229. Some commentators refer to this balancing process as a "sliding scale," because the standard the
state interest must meet increases with the importance of the individual interest being impaired. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-5, at 56-57. Professor Mandiberg argues
that a defendant's right to present defense evidence and the state's interest in administering criminal justice are both compelling, and should be balanced against each other by
considering the importance of the interests under the circumstances presented in each
case. Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 230.
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tionally protected rights will not necessarily be found unconstitutional."
The first step of the balancing process entails weighing the defendant's
interest.74 The defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence is
measured in light of the importance of the evidence under the particular
facts of the case." The importance of excluded evidence depends on the
reliability of the evidence, as well as its probative value, in supporting
the issue the evidence is offered to prove.76 Thus, the more crucial an issue supported by excluded evidence is to the ultimate disposition of the
case, the more compelling the defendant's interest. 77 The availability of
alternative evidence to support the issue, on the other
hand, tends to de78
interest.
defendant's
the
of
importance
the
tract from
The second step in the balancing process entails weighing the importance of the state's interest. 79 The state's interest is measured based on
73. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 13.8, at 556. For example, the Court
often has supported court-imposed sanctions precluding evidence sought to be introduced
by the defendant. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 153 (1991) (finding that the exclusion of evidence pertaining to a defendant's own past sexual conduct with the victim as a
sanction for failing to comply with notice and hearing requirements may have been constitutional); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413 (1988) (finding a state's interest in the orderly conduct of the trial process more important than the defendant's interest in presenting testimony precluded by sanction).
74. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-5, at 56; see also Clinton, supra note 12, at
799-800 (reasoning that the importance of excluded evidence must be analyzed based on
its importance to the accused's total defense).
75. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-4, at 38 (reasoning that the importance of
exculpatory evidence depends on the availability of alternative evidence, the reliability of
the evidence, the probative value of the evidence, and the importance of the fact the evidence is offered to prove). In Crane v. Kentucky, the lower court allowed evidence of the
defendant's confession, but excluded evidence the defendant sought to present regarding
the credibility of that confession. 476 U.S. 683, 686-87 (1986). The Supreme Court reasoned that the excluded evidence was "all but indispensable" to any chance of success for
the defense. Id. at 691. Similarly, in Chambers v. Mississippi, the excluded evidence was
deemed "critical" to the defense. 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
76. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-4(a), at 38. In Green v. Georgia, the
Court reasoned that "substantial reasons existed to assume [the] reliability" of excluded
hearsay evidence. 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979). In Chambers, the Court stressed that excluded
testimony "bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness," and was "critical" to the defendant's case. 410 U.S. at 302.
77. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-4, at 49-50. In Webb v. Texas, the Court
found a constitutional violation where the excluded witness was the only source of the
proffered evidence. 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972). In Crane, the Court reasoned that the defendant was "effectively disabled from answering the one question every rational juror
need[ed] answered." 476 U.S. at 689. And in Green, the Court found excluded testimony
"highly relevant to a critical issue." 442 U.S. at 97.
78. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-4, at 39-40; Mandiberg, supra note 44, at
248 (reasoning that one of the primary inquiries of the balancing test focuses on whether
a state could have used less restrictive means to achieve its objectives).
79. See IMWINKELRiED, supra note 34, § 2-5, at 56-57.
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the necessity of the state statute in achieving legitimate state objectives."

Legitimate state objectives are those aimed at increasing the reliability or
efficiency of the trial process.81 Both the importance of the state's objective and the necessity of the statute in achieving that objective are critical
factors.82 If there are less restrictive means available to meet the state's
objectives, the state interest will be afforded less weight by a court. 3
Conversely, a statute that is necessary to achieve a state's legitimate ob-

jectives will be afforded greater weight'l
The final step of the balancing process entails comparing the state and
individual interests to determine which is more important. This comparison is made to determine which interest is more important under the

particular circumstances presented by the case." The importance of the
defendant's interest sets the standard that the state's interest must exceed to be deemed constitutionally valid.87 Some commentators have referred to this approach as a "sliding scale," because the importance of
the state interest that is necessary to overcome the defendant's interest
80. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991). A defendant's rights may
"'bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process."' Id. at 149
(quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973))). State restrictions on a defendant's right to present evidence, however, must not be "'arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve."' Id. at 151.

81. See supra note 44 (discussing legitimate state interests); see also Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 236 (reasoning that a state's interests in reliability and efficiency should be
considered compelling); cf Clinton, supra note 12, at 801 (arguing that only a compelling
state interest should be allowed to overcome a defendant's right to present a defense).
82. See Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 230.
83. See id. at 229; see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1380 (1996) (striking
down a procedural rule because the state's interest in the prompt and orderly disposition
of its criminal caseload could be achieved at less cost to the defendant's fundamental
rights). Impositions upon a defendant's constitutional rights should be drawn narrowly.
See id. at 1377. The Court is more likely to permit a state practice that affects only a narrow class of defendants. See id. The more broadly applicable a restriction is to a class of
evidence, see Crane,476 U.S. at 690, or to a class of defendants, see Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at
1377, the less weight it will be afforded. See also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)
(finding unconstitutional the wholesale exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony).
Professor Mandiberg suggests that a state's interest in ensuring the reliability and efficiency of the trial process is compelling, but does not justify the "blanket exclusion of
negativing evidence unless that is the least intrusive means of furthering those interests."
Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 237.
84. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413 (1988) (reasoning that although alternatives were available, the one chosen by the state was necessary to adequately serve the
state's important interests in limiting prejudice to the prosecution and harm to the adversary system).
85. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 34, § 2-5, at 56.
86. See id. at 56-57.
87.

See id.
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increases or decreases depending on the gravity of the defendant's interest under the circumstances presented.?
In summary, a defendant does not have an unfettered right to present
evidence. 9 Rather, a state may adopt procedures and rules that impair a
defendant's constitutionally protected rights if the state's interest is sufficiently compelling."

II. MONTANA V. EGELHOFP IGNORING THE EFFECT OF MONTANA'S
EXCLUSIONARY STATUTE ON EGELHOFF'S CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED RIGHTS
In Montana v. Egelhoff,9" the Supreme Court considered whether a
Montana statute, which excluded exculpatory evidence of intoxication as
it related to a defendant's mental state, violated a defendant's fundamental right to present a defense. 92 James Egelhoff was found by police in
the back seat of a car on the side of a highway with two dead victims in
the front seat. 93 The victims were each killed by a single gunshot wound
to the head.? Police found Egelhoff's pistol on the floorboard in front of
the driver's seat with two expended rounds. 9 Egelhoff had gunshot residue on his hands, and his gun matched the type used to kill the victims. 9'
He was intoxicated when the police arrived, and registered a blood alcohol content of .36 one hour after police arrested him.97 Witnesses stated
that Egelhoff had spent the day drinking with the victims. 9' Egelhoff was
charged with two counts of deliberate homicide. 99
Egelhoff testified at trial that he was too intoxicated to have commit-

88. See id.; Clinton, supra note 12, at 800-01 (recommending a totality of the circumstances balancing test that can be likened to a sliding scale); Mandiberg, supra note 44, at
248 (recommending that the state be limited to the least restrictive means necessary to
achieve compelling goals); Schure, supra note 11, at 758-60 (discussing cases in which the
Court has utilized a sliding scale).
89. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410 (reasoning that a defendant does not have a right to
offer testimony that is "incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard
rules of evidence").
90. See id. at 410-11.
91. 116 S.Ct. 2013 (1996).
92. Id. at 2016 (plurality opinion).

93. See id
94. See id.

95. See id.
96. See id.

97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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ted the murders.' ° He further testified that he was unable to remember
the details of that night due to his intoxication."' He insisted that a
fourth person was traveling with the group and may have shot the victims. " The trial court instructed the members of the jury that they could
not consider Egelhoff's intoxication in deciding whether he had acted
knowingly or purposely," 3 the requisite mental states necessary to commit deliberate homicide pursuant to Montana law.' ° The jury found
Egelhoff guilty of both counts of deliberate homicide, and the court sentenced him to eighty-four years in prison.' 3
Egelhoff appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, arguing that the
statute and instruction violated his due process rights."6 The Montana
Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial."7 The
court reasoned that Montana's exclusionary statute prevented Egelhoff
from presenting evidence relevant to an essential element of the crime,
and therefore violated his right to present a defense pursuant to Chambers."8 The court further reasoned that by denying the defendant the
right to present evidence, the statute effectively relieved the prosecution
of its burden of proof and violated Egelhoff's right to be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.'O
A. The Plurality Opinion: Limiting the ConstitutionalInquiry to a Facial
Analysis
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Montana Supreme Court and upheld Montana's exclusionary statute." In an opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, a plurality of the Court noted the
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1995). The statute states that a
person acts purposely when "it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result," and a person acts knowingly when "he is aware of his conduct
or when he is aware under the circumstances his conduct constitutes a crime; or, when he
is aware there exists the high probability that his conduct will cause a specific result." Id.
104. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016 (plurality opinion); see also MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-5-102 (1995) (defining the crime of deliberate homicide).
105. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016 (plurality opinion).
106. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 261 (1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996)
(plurality opinion).

107. See id. at 267.
108.
109.

110.

See id. at 265.
See id. at 266.
See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (plurality opinion); id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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well-settled principle that relevant evidence may be excluded for "valid
reasons."' Relying on Patterson v. New York,"' Justice Scalia reasoned
that a state restriction should be questioned only if it "offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.""' He examined early common law
restrictions on the use of intoxication as an excuse,' as well as the continued exclusion of intoxication evidence by ten states, ' 5 to find that jury
consideration of evidence of intoxication related to a defendant's mental
state is not a fundamental principle of justice."6 He concluded that there

was no constitutional violation because Montana's exclusionary statute
served a legitimate objective in ensuring the reliability of the evidence
presented at trial and comported with society's moral belief that drunk-

111. Id. at 2017 (plurality opinion). Various evidentiary grounds exist for the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence under the FederalRules of Evidence, such as prejudice and hearsay. See id.; FED. R. EViD. 403; FED. R. EVID. 802. In addition, the Court
has recognized constitutional exclusions when a legitimate state interest outweighs a defendant's right to present evidence. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (plurality opinion).
In Taylor v. Illinois, the Court concluded that an evidentiary preclusion sanction outweighed a defendant's right to present evidence because it was necessary to serve compelling state goals. 484 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1988).
112. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
113. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2019 (plurality opinion) (quoting Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
114. See id. at 2018.
115. See id. at 2020-21 & n.2. Only ten states bar jury consideration of the effects of
intoxication on the issue of mental states that are elements of an offense: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, South Carolina, and
Texas. See id. at 2020 n.2; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-503 (West Supp. 1996);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-207 (Michie 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1995); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-4 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-230(2) (Michie 1994); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 562.076 (West Supp. 1997); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (West 1994); Lanier v. State, 533 So. 2d. 473, 478-79 (Miss.
1988) (applying to Mississippi); State v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330-31 (S.C. 1977) (applying to South Carolina).
116. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2021 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia's historical
analysis was based on eighteenth century English common law, which prohibited the use
of intoxication as an excuse for a crime. See id. at 2018. He recognized that by the end of
the nineteenth century, the prominent new American rule allowed evidence of intoxication to negate the element of intent for specific intent crimes. See id. at 2018-19. He acknowledged an argument made by the defendant's amicus that this new rule was deeply
rooted at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. See id. at 2019; Brief
for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae at 23, Montana
v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (No. 95-566). Yet, Justice Scalia did not address this
argument on its merits. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2019 (plurality opinion). Instead, he
reasoned that the burden of proof was on the defendant to show that Montana's rule violated some principle rooted in tradition and history, which he concluded the defendant
had not done. See id.
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enness should not provide an excuse for criminal behavior."7
B. The Concurring Opinion: Deferringto the State of Montana by
Inferring that It Merely Redefined the Mental Element of Deliberate
Homicide
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment of the Court, but based

her approval of Montana's exclusionary statute on a state's power to define the elements of its crimes and defenses." 8 She reasoned that the
statute could be characterized as a rule excluding evidence, or as a "redefinition of the elements of deliberate homicide.""' 9 Accepting the lat-

ter of these two characterizations, she determined that it was within the
power of the state to define the elements of its criminal offenses. 2
Where a plausible constitutionally valid interpretation is available, the
Court should accept that interpretation.' Without further inquiry, she
pointed out that a significant minority of the states have upheld similar
statutes as legislative changes to the elements of a crime.' Thus, Justice
117. See Egelhoff, 116 S.Ct. at 2020-21. Justice Scalia argued that violent behavior
while intoxicated is learned behavior. See id. at 2021 (plurality opinion). Since many jurors may have the same learned belief that drunkenness begets violence, they may also
believe that a defendant who was drunk at the time of the incident giving rise to the
charge may have been incapable of forming the requisite intent. See id. Therefore, he
concluded that such evidence may be unreliable. See id.
118. See id. at 2024-25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
119. Id. Justice Ginsburg explained that Montana's statute could be interpreted in
two ways. See id. First, it could be interpreted as an exclusionary statute that precludes a
defendant from utilizing evidence of intoxication as it relates to intent. See id. Second, it
could be interpreted as a redefinition of the mental element of deliberate homicide. See
id. Since the first interpretation raised constitutional questions concerning Egelhoff's
right to present a defense, Justice Ginsburg determined that Montana merely exercised
its power to define the mental element of deliberate homicide. See id. Thus, she avoided
the constitutional problem presented by construing the case as an evidentiary exclusion.
See id.
120. See id. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that Montana's Supreme Court should have
deferred to the legislature, which has primary responsibility for defining the elements of
its crimes and providing allowable defenses. See id. at 2025-26. By interpreting the Montana statute as a redefinition, she reasoned that intoxication evidence was no longer exculpatory evidence and therefore did not impair the defendant's right to present evidence
in his defense. See id.
121. See id. at 2025 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
122. See id.; see also State v. Ramos, 648 P.2d 119, 121 (Ariz. 1982) (reasoning that
state legislatures have "considerable freedom" in determining the mental states of
crimes); State v. Souza, 813 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Haw. 1991) (reasoning that the exclusion of
evidence of intoxication relating to the mental state of crimes constituted a redefinition
by the legislature); Commonwealth v. Rumsey, 454 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(reasoning that the legislature may emphasize concerns, such as a desire to expose intoxicated offenders to more serious liability in defining the requisite mental state of a crime).
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Ginsburg agreed with Justice Scalia in concluding that the statute represented a legitimate exercise of state power and did not violate Egelhoff's
constitutional rights.'23
C. The Dissenting Opinions:Protectinga Defendant's Right to Presenta
Defense and to be Proven Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
1.

Justice O'Connor,Dissenting: Recognizing the Operative Effects of
Montana's Exclusionary Statute on Egelhoffs FundamentalRights

Three justices in Montana v. Egelhoff wrote dissenting opinions."
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
joined, argued that Egelhoff had a fundamental right to present a defense. 5 ,Justice O'Connor concluded that by precluding exculpatory
evidence that related to an essential element of the crime charged, Montana's exclusionary statute unconstitutionally compromised Egelhoff's
ability to present a defense." 6 She distinguished an evidentiary exclusion
aimed at ensuring the integrity of the trial process, from a blanket exclusion of a type of evidence that is relevant to an essential element of the
crime." She reasoned that the Montana statute was designed solely to
increase the likelihood of a conviction for a class of defendants and
therefore served no legitimate state objective.'28 She also concluded that
123. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
2034 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126. See id.
127. See id. at 2029-30. Justice O'Connor pointed out that while the common law rule
against using intoxication as a defense prevailed from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century, the rule changed as the criminal law became more refined. See id. She
noted that it is well-settled that intoxication evidence is relevant and admissible to determine whether the mental element of a crime was present, citing a New York state court
for the proposition that:
where the nature and essence of the crime are made by law to depend upon the
peculiar state and condition of the criminal's mind at the time with reference to
the act done, drunkenness may be a proper subject for the consideration of the
jury, not to excuse or mitigate the offence but to show that it was not committed.
Id. at 2030 (quoting People v. Robinson, 2 Park. Crim. 235, 306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855)).
128. See id. at 2031. According to Justice O'Connor, the sole purpose for the exclusion was to improve the state's chances of obtaining a conviction against those accused of
committing crimes while intoxicated. See id. Montana did not argue otherwise, and did
not argue that the rule was aimed at excluding unreliable, cumulative, privileged, or irrelevant evidence. See id. at 2029. Justice O'Connor reasoned that in previous cases,
such as Chambers and Washington, the state had at least argued that the excluded evidence was unreliable. See id.; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (concluding that the state did not justify its exclusionary statute).
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the statute operated so as to relieve the state of its constitutionally prescribed burden of proof. 2 9 Although Justice O'Connor agreed with Jus-

tice Ginsburg that a state is free to define the elements of its offenses,
Justice O'Connor reasoned that once a state defines the elements of its

crimes, it then should not be permitted to circumvent a defendant's ability to present exculpatory evidence to challenge the existence of those
elements."o
2. Justice Souter's Dissent: Conductinga Second Inquiry to Balance
the Competing State and Individual Interests
Justice Souter also concluded that Montana could have redefined the

elements of the crime of deliberate homicide.'

He was unwilling to ac-

cept Justice Ginsburg's assertion, however, that Montana had done so
with its exclusionary statute. 32 Instead, he pointed to the Montana Supreme Court's decision, wherein that court expressly determined that the
Montana statute did not constitute a redefinition of the elements of deliberate homicide. 33 He reasoned that the Supreme Court should defer

to Montana's highest court to interpret Montana law.' 34
Justice Souter explained that the historical analysis conducted by Justice Scalia was only the first of a two-step inquiry 13' The second inquiry,
which he asserted the plurality ignored, is whether Montana's exclusion-

ary statute operated in such a way as to impair any constitutionally pro-

129. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2027-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
reasoned that the Montana statute impaired the defendant's ability to defend by excluding the presentation of a type of evidence that negates an essential element of deliberate
homicide, and thereby lightens the prosecution's burden of proof as to the mental element
of the crime. See id at 2028. She explained that the prosecution must normally work to
overcome doubts raised by the defense. See id. If the defendant is prevented from introducing evidence that may raise doubts, however, the prosecution will not have to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. She concluded that when a defendant is not allowed to present evidence, the jury may in fact impute culpability that does not exist. See
id.; see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 266 (Mont. 1995) (arguing that the jury
may be misled into believing that the state has proven the mental state), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
2013 (1996) (plurality opinion).
130. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2027 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting).
132. See id.; see also supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text (explaining Justice
O'Connor's reasoning).
133. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting).
134. See id. Justice Souter explained that R.A. V. v. St. Paul,505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992),
and Murdock v. Memphis, 20 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), supported his assertion that the

Court should defer to the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of Montana law. See
id. at 2033.
135. See id. at 2032.
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tected right.1' 3 Justice Souter stated that the right to present evidence in
one's defense is a fundamental principle of justice that has been long
recognized by the Court.'37 He noted that Montana failed to provide any
justification for its statute, which impaired Egelhoff's right to present a
defense.'3 He considered two possible justifications, but concluded that
neither could overcome the fact that Montana merely had to redefine
the elements of deliberate homicide to achieve its objectives, rather than
impair Egelhoff's fundamental rights."9
3. Justice Breyer's Dissent.Questioning the Objective of Montana's
ExclusionaryStatute
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joined, noted that the Montana statute forces a jury to draw inferences solely from external circumstances, thereby making specific intent unnecessary to obtain a conviction. ' ° He reasoned that the statute imposed liability based on a
negligence standard rather than on actual mental culpability.
He explained that the statute could have anomalous results.
Thus, he questioned whether
Montana's
exclusionary
statute
served
any legitimate
43
state interest.1

136.
137.
138.

See id. at 2032-33.
See id.
See id. at 2033-34.

139. See id. Justice Souter reasoned that Montana could have redefined the elements
of deliberate homicide so as to give exculpatory evidence no relevance. See id. at 2033.
Alternatively, he thought Montana could have provided valid reasons to justify its exclusionary statute. See id. at 2033-34. Justice Souter speculated that Montana might have
justified the statute by arguing that it was irrational to allow intoxication evidence as to
mental state, but not as a defense, or by arguing that it was confusing to the jury to allow
intoxication evidence as it related to mental state but not to allow it as an outright defense. See id at 2034.

140. See id. at 2035 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer hypothesized that, on the
one hand, a jury would convict a drunk driver of deliberate homicide if the driver stopped
at a traffic light and then accidentally killed a pedestrian by stepping on the accelerator.
See id. In that case, the jury presumably would infer intent or purpose without knowledge
of the driver's intoxication. See id. On the other hand, a jury would find a drunk driver
who raced down a highway and unknowingly sideswiped another car causing it to crash,
not guilty, because the jury would infer, without knowledge of the driver's intoxication,
the driver was merely negligent. See id. Justice Breyer noted that despite the anomalous
results, the drivers would be equally culpable. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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III. A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
AFTER EGELHOFF

The plurality in Montana v. Egelhoff held that a state may impair a defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence, even if such evidence is
relevant to an essential element of the crime.' 44 In doing so, the plurality
restricted Chambers to its facts1 45 and thereby potentially jeopardized a
defendant's fundamental right to present a defense and to be proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'
A majority of the Court, however, did not restrict the holding in
Chambers.141 Unlike the plurality, Justice Ginsburg recognized the constitutional implications of the case on a defendant's right to present evi-

dence when she specifically avoided raising the constitutional concern by
interpreting the Montana statute as a redefinition of the mental state
necessary to commit deliberate homicide. 44 Thus, the precedential value
of the decision on a defendant's fundamental rights is unclear, except
that exculpatory evidence of intoxication may now be restricted by the
states without constitutional question.149 The case raises significant questions about the analytical approach the Court will undertake in the fu144. See id. at 2023 (plurality opinion). The holding may be more narrowly construed
as allowing a state to suppress evidence of intoxication as it relates to a defendant's mental state. See id. at 2024. If broadly construed, the holding is likely to cause confusion as
to the proper test to use to consider the validity of other evidentiary exclusions. See id. at
2021-22.
145. See id. at 2022 ("Chambers was an exercise in highly case-specific error correction."); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Chambers).
146. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2027 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 2024-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (providing Justice Ginsburg's reasoning for concurring in the judgment

of the Court).
148. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg explained that the Court was divided as to how to characterize the question presented by
the case. See id. She reasoned that construing the statute as a redefinition of the mental
element of deliberate homicide alleviated Justice O'Connor's due process concerns. See
id.

149. See id. (plurality opinion). Concurring opinions can be separated into two categories: concurrences in judgment and simple concurrences. See Igor Kirman, Note,
Standing Apart to be a Part: The PrecedentialValue of Supreme Court Concurring Opin-

ions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2084 (1995). A concurrence in judgment expresses
agreement with the majority's result, but not its reasoning, while a simple concurrence
expresses agreement with the majority's result and reasoning. See id. A concurrence in
judgment represents a dissent with regard to discerning the precedential value of a case.
See id. In Egelhoff, Justice Ginsburg provided a concurrence in the judgment only. See
Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Thus, the reasoning provided by
the plurality in Egelhoff should not be considered precedential. See Kirman, supra, at
2084.
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ture to determine whether an evidentiary exclusion is constitutionally
valid.150

The analytical framework utilized in Egelhoff is problematic for two
reasons. First, in deciding whether the Montana statute violated a con-

stitutionally protected right on its face, the Court disregarded the longstanding' and wide-spread12 practice of allowing a defendant to present
evidence of intoxication as it relates to specific intent crimes. 53 Second,
150. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the
Court must consider the effect of a statute on a defendant's fundamental rights in addition to conducting an historical analysis of the statute); id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that the plurality ignored the second due process inquiry).
151. See id. at 2019 (plurality opinion). During the nineteenth century, the courts significantly modified the common law rule that precluded the use of intoxication as an excuse. See Jerome Hall, Intoxication and CriminalResponsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045,
1049 (1944). In Regina v. Cruse, the court instructed the jury that intoxication might disprove the intention required to prove assault with intent to murder. 173 Eng. Rep. 610,
610 (N.P. 1838); see also Hall, supra, at 1049.
In American jurisprudence, the allowance of intoxication evidence to exculpate also
can be traced to the nineteenth century. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2030 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also Aszman v. State, 24 N.E. 123, 125 (Ind. 1890); State v. Donovan, 16
N.W. 206, 206 (Iowa 1883); Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555, 557 (1846); Swan v. State, 23
Tenn. (4 Hum.) 128, 133 (1843). Thus, the allowance of intoxication evidence to exculpate intent has a history dating over 150 years. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2030
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 2019 (plurality opinion). By the end of the nineteenth century, most
states allowed intoxication evidence to exculpate intent. See Hall, supra note 151, at
1049. In fact, as early as 1881, in Hopt v. People, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized
the distinction between using intoxication as an excuse and using it to exculpate the mental element of a crime. 104 U.S. 631, 633-34 (1881). In Hopt, the Court considered the
validity of a jury instruction concerning the intent required to commit first degree murder.
Id. The Court adopted a predominate theme in state court rulings and distinguished the
common law rule that called for the wholesale exclusion of intoxication evidence, reasoning:
[W]hen a statute establishing different degrees of murder requires deliberate
premeditation in order to constitute murder in the first degree, the question
whether the accused is in such a condition of mind, by reason of drunkenness or
otherwise, as to be capable of deliberate premeditation, necessarily becomes a
material subject of consideration by the jury.
Id. at 634.
153. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2030-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
pointed out that despite the plurality's historical analysis, "[alt the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified [in 1868], the common-law rule on consideration of intoxication
evidence was in flux." Id. at 2031. Justice Scalia acknowledged, but dismissed this argument, claiming that the burden remained on Egelhoff to show that the new American
rule-that intoxication may be considered on the question of specific intent-was so
deeply rooted in American traditions as to have become a fundamental principle of justice. See id. at 2019 (plurality opinion). The Montana Supreme Court's holding was not
premised upon whether Egelhoff had a fundamental right to present evidence of intoxication; rather, the Montana Supreme Court recognized that Egelhoff had a fundamental
right to present a defense that included the right to present exculpatory evidence as to the
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the Court ignored the fact that an evidentiary exclusion, such as the one
provided by Montana's statute in this case, may adversely impair a defendant's fundamental right to present a defense and to be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt."1
A. A Defendant's Right to PresentEvidence of Intoxication Placed in
ProperPerspective

The Court's historical analysis relied primarily on the common law
axiom that a defendant should not be allowed to use intoxication as an
excuse."' Justice Scalia extrapolated from that principle that exculpatory
evidence of intoxication has no significant tradition or history and, therefore, serves no fundamental principle of justice. 56 He failed to distinguish between intoxication as an excuse and evidence of intoxication

used as exculpatory evidence in a defense" 7 In Egelhoff, the defendant
presented evidence of intoxication to challenge the prosecution's assertion that he was capable of having committed deliberate homicide. 5 ' He
did not use intoxication as an excuse. 159
essential elements of the offense charged. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 265-66
(Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (plurality opinion).
154. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2027 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Montana statute
"forestalls the defendant's ability to raise an effective defense." Id. This effect is just as
important to the due process analysis as the historical analysis entertained by Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion. See id.; see also id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting). The historical analysis is "not the end of the due process enquiry." See id.
155. See id. at 2018 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia argued that the common law
rejection of intoxication as an excuse could not be construed to permit a defendant to
show that intoxication prevented him from having the mental state necessary to have
committed the crime. See id.
156. See id. at 2018-19.
157. See id. Professor Nemerson reasons that intoxication is relevant to criminal liability in four ways: (1) it might show that the defendant was too drunk to physically
commit the crime, (2) it might show an absence of voluntary conduct, (3) it might negate
a mental state necessary to prove the crime, and (4) it might provide a claim of excuse on
the grounds of insanity. Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication,and the Criminal

Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 419 (1988). Nemerson distinguishes between the use of
intoxication evidence "negativing" the mental element of a crime, and the use of intoxication as an excuse. Id. at 422; see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d. 260, 268 (Nelson, J.,
concurring) (distinguishing between an affirmative defense and the presentation of exculpatory evidence), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (plurality opinion).
158. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016 (plurality opinion).
159. See id. Egelhoff attempted to present evidence of intoxication claiming that he
was too intoxicated to physically commit the killings. See id. Egelhoff was not able to
present evidence of intoxication as to his mental state, however, pursuant to Montana
law. See id.; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995). Furthermore, the lower court
instructed the jury that this evidence could not be used in determining whether Egelhoff
possessed the requisite mental state to have committed deliberate homicide. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 28-31 and accompanying
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The use of exculpatory evidence of any kind at trial does not have extensive historical precedent.' ° A defendant's ability to defend by presenting evidence did not develop until the nineteenth century. 6' At the
same time, the defendant's right to present exculpatory intoxication evi-

dence as to his mental state began to develop.'62 Today, forty states recognize a defendant's right to use evidence of intoxication to challenge
specific intent crimes such as deliberate homicide.'
Thus, the use of in-

toxication evidence to exculpate a defendant's intent is no more a "widespread experiment," as Justice Scalia suggested, than is the use of any
other exculpatory evidence.i 4 In fact, all exculpatory evidence, including
text (discussing the Montana Supreme Court's determination that Egelhoff had been denied the opportunity to raise doubt about his mental state).
160. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2029-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use
of intoxication to exculpate intent developed as the criminal law developed). See generally Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 633-34 (1881) (distinguishing between the common law
rule excluding intoxication evidence and a statutory rule that grades differing degrees of
murder according to the defendant's state of mind); Clinton, supra note 12, at 739 (concluding that formalized rules of criminal procedure only began to develop in the nineteenth century and often excluded evidence that would be useful to the defense).
161. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 739. The typical criminal trial of the eighteenth
century had few formal rules regarding evidence or procedure. See id. Not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did the laws of evidence and criminal procedure become
solidified. See id. United States v. Reid was the first Supreme Court case challenging an
evidentiary exclusion. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 362-63 (1851); see also Clinton, supra note
12, at 742. In Reid, the Supreme Court considered a Virginia statute that excluded accomplice witness testimony because it was deemed unreliable. 53 U.S. at 361-62. The
Court reasoned that since a right to call an accomplice had not been recognized by the
state, and was not guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, it was not a constitutionally guaranteed right. See id. at 363. Reid was overruled by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467
(1918). In Rosen, the Court expressed its preference to submit evidence to the jury and
rely on the adversarial system to reach the truth. Id. at 471. Rosen was not decided on
constitutional grounds, however, but instead on the basis of statutory interpretation and
the discretionary power of the Court over the judicial process. Id. at 471-72.
162. See Hall, supra note 151, at 1048 (arguing that a "radical modification" in the law
concerning intoxication occurred in the nineteenth century). Early common law made no
allowance for intoxication and criminal conduct, and from the sixteenth century through
the early nineteenth century this rule prevailed. See id. at 1046. However, courts began
to consider intoxication evidence as it relates to intent as early as 1819. See id. at 1048-49;
cf. Clinton, supra note 12, at 739 (noting that a trend developed during the nineteenth
century to codify rules of evidence and procedure).
163. See supra note 115 (listing ten states that bar evidence of intoxication as it relates
to a defendant's mental state). Thus, a large majority of the states allow a defendant to
present evidence of intoxication to negative mental state. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2019
(plurality opinion); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1)-(2) (allowing evidence of intoxication to negate purpose and knowledge, but not recklessness).
164. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2021 (plurality opinion); see Hall, supra note 151, at 1050.
Referring to intoxication evidence, Hall wrote that "the doctrine permitting disproof of
intention has been widely accepted and has functioned to ameliorate the severe operation
of the older law in most jurisdictions." Id.
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evidence of intoxication, serves the goals of the adversarial process,
which is premised upon the principle that a jury should be permitted to
discern the truth.'65 Justice Scalia disregarded this consideration. 66 Instead, he speculated that intoxication evidence may be considered unreliable and reasoned that the exclusion of intoxication evidence serves the
same moral imperative served by the early common law prohibition of
intoxication as an excuse. This reasoning fails to recognize the moral
imperative served by a judicial system that depends on adversarial con-

frontation and jury scrutiny. 6 '
B. The Second Inquiry: DiscerningWhether a FundamentalRight is

Impaired by the Operationof a Statute
In Montana v. Egelhoff, the Court limited its inquiry to a facial analysis of Montana's exclusionary statute without considering the operative
effects the statute had on Egelhoff's constitutional rights.'69 Clearly
every evidentiary exclusion has some effect on a defendant's fundamen-

tal right to present a defense and to be proven guilty beyond a reason-

165. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). In Nixon, the Court explained the importance of a defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence, stating:
We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the
parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant
facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends
of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the
facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.
Id.
In Washington v. Texas, the Court concluded that "the conviction of our time that the
truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons.., who may
seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of
such testimony to be determined by the jury." 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (quoting Rosen v.
United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918) (emphasis added); see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400,429 (1988) (invoking the same language in an evidentiary exclusion case).
166. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2021-22 (plurality opinion).
167. See id. at 2020-21. Justice Scalia contended that the rule "comports with and implements society's moral perception that one who has voluntarily impaired his own faculties should be responsible for the consequences." Id.
168. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709 (emphasizing a preference to develop all relevant evidence). The integrity of the judicial system depends on full disclosure of all the facts in
order to ensure that justice is done. See id.; United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-31
(1975) (extending the preference for full disclosure enunciated in Nixon to the prosecution); see also Nance, supra note 50, at 872-73 (reasoning that the suppression of evidence
constitutes an affront to the judicial tribunal and all of the parties that are given the responsibility to resolve a judicial matter).
169. 116 S. Ct. at 2030-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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able doubt.1 7 If a defendant is not allowed to present evidence, he is not
able to prepare an adequate defense. 17 ' And if he is not able to provide a
defense, the prosecution will not have to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt."' This relationship between the presentation of defense evidence and the state's burden of proof explains why evidentiary exclusion

cases since Chambers have consistently presumed that a defendant has a
fundamental right to present a defense that includes a right to present
evidence.7 Instead of making an extensive facial inquiry to determine
whether a defendant has a fundamental right to present a specific type of

evidence, as the plurality did in this case, the Court traditionally has balanced the competing state and individual interests to determine which
interest is more important under the circumstances presented. 74
In Egelhoff, the Court failed to consider whether Montana's exclu-

sionary statute impaired Egelhoff's fundamental right to present a defense and to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.75 Although
the Court has decided evidentiary exclusion cases with divergent results,

and often has found important state interests supporting such exclusions,

176

the Court consistently has recognized these constitutional

170. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 796, 809.
171. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2028 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Every evidentiary
exclusion implicates to some degree a defendant's right to present a defense. See Clinton,
supra note 12, at 796, 809.
172. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 809; see also Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 234-35.
Professor Mandiberg argues that "[u]nless doubts about admitting the evidence are resolved in the defendant's favor, too much unreviewable discretion will be allowed to the
prosecution, and the 'hoop' that makes up a good part of the presumption of innocence
will be a mere formality." Id. at 235.
173. See supra note 20 (discussing cases following Chambers).
174. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016 (plurality opinion). In Egelhoff, the Court asked
only the narrow question of whether Egelhoff had a fundamental right to present exculpatory evidence of intoxication, but failed to recognize the effect Montana's statute had on
his fundamental rights to defend and to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 2016. Thus, the Court failed to balance Egelhoff's rights against the state's interests to
determine which was more important under the circumstances presented. See id. at 202122. This very narrow approach differs significantly from previous cases, which focused on
the broad question of whether the effect of an evidentiary exclusion denied the defendant
a fundamental right to present his defense. See supra Part I.C. (describing the balancing
test).
175. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2027-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. See, e.g., Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1991) (supporting a preclusion
sanction where the defendant failed to comply with notice requirements under state rape
shield laws); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988) (supporting the preclusion of
witness testimony as a sanction for violating discovery rules); California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479, 491 (1984) (concluding that due process did not require that the police preserve
breath samples that might have been presented by the defendant at trial); United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241-42 (1975) (upholding a preclusion sanction for failing to comply
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rights.'77 In Egelhoff, the Court not only refused to recognize the impairment of these rights, but failed to recognize them when the evidence

that was excluded was relevant to an essential element of the crime."'
C. A ProperDispositionof Montana v. Egelhoff: Balancing the
Competing Interests

Had the Court considered the operative effects of Montana's exclusionary statute on Egelhoff's constitutionally protected rights, it first
would have determined the importance of the competing interests, and
then it would have balanced those interests to determine which interest

was more important under the facts presented.'79
Egelhoff's interest in presenting intoxication evidence as it related to
8 The evidence was essential
his mental state was significant in this case. "O
to the heart of his defense, which entailed challenging the State's assertion that he was capable of having committed deliberate homicide as defined by Montana law.'' While he was permitted to introduce evidence

of his intoxication to question the State's assertion that he pulled the
trigger, he was not allowed to use it to question the State's assertion that
he acted purposely or knowingly.'u The evidence in this case was reliable and probative of Egelhoff's intent.8 3 Furthermore, his intoxicated

state was the primary evidence available to him to question the State's
assertion that he acted with purpose or knowledge, particularly since he

with a court order).
177. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) (holding that excluding all
hypnotically refreshed testimony violated a defendant's right to testify on his own behalf
under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690-91 (1986) (finding that the exclusion of evidence pertaining to the credibility of a confession violated due process); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974) (holding that
excluding the cross-examination of a crucial juvenile witness violated the defendant's
right to present testimony guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause). In Taylor, Justice
Brennan concluded, in dissent, that the Court had conducted a searching inquiry into the
basis for "every challenged exclusion of criminal defense evidence that has come before it
to date." 484 U.S. at 424.
178. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2026 (O'Connor. J., dissenting).
179. See supra Parts I.B. and I.C (discussing the balancing test).
180. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The importance of a
defendant's interest is measured in terms of its reliability, probative value, importance to
the overall defense, and the availability of alternative evidence to prove the assertion the
excluded evidence is presented to prove. See supra Part I.C.
181. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The intoxication evidence excluded by the Court was relevant to an essential element of the crime that the
prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
182. See id. at 2016 (plurality opinion).
183. See infra note 188 (discussing the reliability of the evidence).
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could not remember the events of that night.8 Thus, the evidence excluded in Egelhoff was "critical" to Egelhoff's ability to present a defense, that focused primarily on raising doubt.8
Conversely, the state's interest in excluding the evidence was minor.'m
Justice Scalia theorized that intoxication evidence is inherently unreliable and asserted that Montana may have had a valid reason for excluding it."' As Justice Souter pointed out, Montana failed to provide any
justification for the statute." Justice Ginsburg explained that where any
constitutionally valid justification is available, it should be utilized to
support a state's laws." 9 The explanation she espoused already had been
discarded, however, by Montana's highest court.'O Thus, it is unclear

184. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 261-63 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
2013 (1996) (plurality opinion). The State was able to present evidence to prove Egelhoff's ability to pull the trigger. See id. at 262. Evidence of his intoxicated state was the
primary means available to him to develop his defense, especially since he had no memory of the events of that night. See id. at 262-63.
185. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the exclusion removed "too critical a category of relevant, exculpatory evidence from the adversarial process by preventing the defendant from making an essential argument"). The
Montana Supreme Court referred to the excluded evidence as "the very evidence that
might convince [the jury] that the State had not proven [intent]." Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at
268 (Nelson, J., concurring).
186. Cf Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2030-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that by excluding evidence of intoxication, the Montana legislature actually relieved the State of its
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
187. See id. at 2021 (plurality opinion); see also supra note 117 (discussing Justice
Scalia's conclusion that evidence of intoxication may be considered unreliable).
188. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2033 (Souter, J., dissenting). In Crane v. Kentucky,
the Court stated: "In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of
exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case
encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."' 476 U.S. 683, 69091 (1986) (quoting United States v. Cronie, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)); see also Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (reasoning that Arkansas had failed to justify the wholesale exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony). The State of Montana did not argue,
nor did the lower court suggest, that the evidence of Egelhoff's intoxication was unreliable. See Respondent's Brief at 31-32 n.16, Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996)
(No. 95-566). In fact, Montana has found evidence of intoxication to be highly reliable to
an entire class of crime involving operating motor vehicles under the influence of alcohol.
See id.
189. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2025 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
190. See id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting). As Justice Souter pointed out, the Court
should defer to a state's highest court in interpreting the meaning of state laws. See id.
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Montana should be the final authority in the interpretation of Montana law. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1992) (holding that a
state supreme court's interpretation of its state's capital sentencing guidelines is controlling). The Supreme Court does not normally "construe a state statute contrary to the
construction given it by the highest court of a State." O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524,
531 (1974); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 237 (1964) (deferring to the state to
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whether Montana's exclusionary statute served any legitimate state objective,"' or whether, as Justice O'Connor reasoned, it was aimed solely
at increasing the likelihood of conviction for a class of defendants, such
as Egelhoff, who were intoxicated when they committed the crimes for
which they were charged. 2 Assuming that Montana's exclusionary statute served some legitimate state interest, the importance of that interest
should have been measured in light of available alternatives."3 Given
that Montana simply could have redefined the elements of the crime
without affecting a defendant's constitutional rights, it is doubtful that
Montana's exclusionary approach could be construed so as to outweigh
Egelhoff's need for the evidence to present his defense. 9 4
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Montana v. Egelhoff, the Court considered a statute that excluded
evidence of intoxication as it relates to a defendant's mental state. The
Court determined that a state may exclude such evidence because a defendant does not have a fundamental right to present evidence of intoxication in his defense. The Court failed, however, to recognize that an
evidentiary exclusion may impair a defendant's ability to present a defense, particularly where the evidence is relevant to an essential element
of the crime. Further, the Court ignored the adverse effect such an exclusion may have on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's
burden of proof. Thus, in Montana v. Egelhoff, the Court departed from
the balancing test it had applied in previous cases when a state impaired
decide questions of state law and refusing to address federal questions that could be controlled by state law decisions).
191. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained
that "the State's failure to offer a justification for excluding relevant evidence leaves us
unable to discern whether there may be a valid reason to support the statute as the State
Supreme Court appears to view it." Id.
192. See id. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 2033-34 (Souter, J., dissenting). Several alternatives are available to a
state wishing to punish crimes where intoxication is involved which are less restrictive
than a blanket exclusion. See generally Mandiberg, supra note 44, at 252-70. Professor
Mandiberg proposes three plausible alternatives available to a state that wants to control
intoxication without restricting a defendant's constitutional rights: (1) creating a civil
commitment procedure for those who commit crimes while intoxicated, similar to that
used for insane offenders; (2) redefining existing offenses so as to make evidence of intoxication irrelevant as a negativing factor; or, (3) creating new offenses specifically for
the intoxicated offender. See id.
194. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2033-34 (Souter, J., dissenting). Montana could have
taken alternative actions to further its objectives concerning intoxicated offenders, including prosecuting offenders such as Egelhoff for negligent homicide, creating an altogether new crime of intoxicated homicide, or changing the regulation of alcohol. See Respondent's Brief at 34-35, Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (No. 95-566).
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a defendant's ability to present a defense. Instead, the Court limited its
inquiry solely to a facial analysis of Montana's exclusionary statute and
addressed the narrow issue of whether evidence of intoxication has historical roots sufficient to make its presentation a fundamental right. Instead of fully considering this question, the Court concluded that the
moral standard served by the preclusion of intoxication as an excuse at
early common law applies equally to the exclusion of intoxication evidence today. Thus, Montana v. Egelhoff represents a questionable application of precedent, creates uncertainty as to how the Court will analyze evidentiary exclusions in the future, and raises a question as to
whether the plurality substituted its own moral judgment as to the culpability of intoxicated offenders for that of the jury.
Jeffrey Scott Robinette

